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APPEAL AND ERROR-DISOBEDIENCE BY JURY OF ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION.-
In an action for breach of contract the trial court erroneously instructed
the jury as to the measure of damages. It appeared by the affidavits of
all the jurors that the measure of damages actually applied was substan-
tially that contended for by the defendant. Held, on appeal, that not-
withstanding the fact that the jury did not follow the erroneous instructions,
but applied the correct rule, the judgment must be reversed. Bondy v. Har-
vey, 217 N. Y. Supp. 877 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1926).
Failure of the jury to follow the erroneous instructions of the trial court
is usually reversible error. Myers v. Cassity, 209 Ky. 315, 272 S. W. 718
(1925); Gaylor v. Munroe, 260 S. W. 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) reversed
on other grounds, 268 S. W. 724 (1925); Lacey v. Great Northern Ry,,
70 Mont. 346, 225 Pac. 808 (1924). But where the jury fails to follow
erroneous instructions and reaches a substantially correct result there
should be no reversal. Rodgers v. Schroeder, 287 S. W. 861 (Mo. 1926);
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Louisville Provision Co., 212 Ky. 709, 279 S. NV.
1100 (1926); Arkla Lumber & M'f'g Go. v. West Virginia Timber Co.,
132 S. E. 840 (Va. 1926). Contra: Myers v. Cassity, supra; see Farmers'
Bank & Trust Co. v. Harding, 209 Ky. 3, 8, 272 S. W. 3, 5 (1925). Such
error is not prejudicial to the appellant. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Louis-
ville Provision Co., supra; Memphis Furniture M'f'g Co. v. Wemyss Furni-
ture Co., 2 Fed. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). A fair and just verdict
should be the end desired, not the preservation of technical and inflexible
rules of procedure. (1923) 21 MIcH. L. REV. 343; (1919) 17 ibid. 592.
Decisions like the instant case result in needless and expensive delay.
APPEAL AND ERROR-PRCEDURAL REFORm-ADmISSION OF EVIDUNCE ON
APPEAL.-In an appeal of an equity case, the respondent moved that leave
be granted to present for oral examination a witness, whose testimony
respondent declared he was deprived of "by accident and mistake." R. I.
Gen. Laws (1923) c. 339, § 30, provided that in equity cases the appellate
court might grant leave to present further evidence when omitted for such
cause. Held, that the motion be granted and order issued that the witness
appear before the Supreme Court at the hearing of the appeal on the merits,
and that the appellant be allowed to present contradictory evidence at that
time. Haynes v. Greene, 134 Atl. 853 (R. I. 1926).
In attempting to limit new trials two things must be avoided: violations
of the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, and the possibility of hav-
ing the new procedure substantially prejudice one of the parties in its
operation. Admission of evidence on appeal, within limits, has been ad-
vocated as an expedient means of shortening litigation. SCOTT, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF PROCEDURE AT LAW (1922) 157-167; Clark, History, Systems
and Functions of Pleading (1925) 11 VA. L. REV. 517, .550. Accordingly,
statutes in several states authorize appellate courts to receive evidence which
the respondent failed to offer below, provided the issue is "capable of
proof by record or other incontrovertible evidence." N. J. Laws 1912, c.
231, § 28; Kan. Laws 1909, c. 182, § 580; Mass. Acts 1913, c. 716, § 3. In
the absence of such legislation such omissions are usually grounds for grant-
ing entire new trials. Lamb v. De Vault, 139 Ill. App. 398 (1908); Varncr
v. Interstate Exchange, 138 Iowa, 201, 115 N. W. 1111 (1908). Such statutes
have been held not to violate the guaranty of trial by jury. Pound, Pro-
cedural Reform (1910) 4 ILL. L. REV. 491, 505. Moreover, the constitutional
guaranty of trial by jury does not extend to issues historically triable in
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equity. Swanson v. Alworth, 209 N. W. 907 (Alinn. 1926). It is often stated
that the equity appellate court tries the case de woro. Rubens v. Rubcns,
101 Wash. 675, 172 Pac. 831 (1918). Some statutes e.xpressly so provide,
declaring that the appellate court should not regard the finding of fact by
the lower court. E. g., Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 9150. Some courts have
construed such provisions as requiring a re-submission of all the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Haggin, 30 Ky. L. 783, 99 S. W. 906 (1907); ef. MridaNJi
v. Fountas, 109 Ohio St. 553, 143 N. E. 129 (1924) (similar construction
given to constitutional provision granting "appellate jurisdiction" in equity
suits). Under this procedure there should be no objection to appellate con-
sideration of oral evidence not admitted below. But others have construed
such statutes as requiring merely a consideration of the trial record. XM.:_ch
v. Tassler, 108 Neb. 208, 187 N. W. 796 (1922). Even under such procedure
there would seem to be no objection to admitting evidence on i-sucs not
tried below. But on other issues, the admission of oral evidence before the
appellate court would present the difficulty of weighing oral evidence againA
documentary evidence. Prejudice resulting from this difficulty is not lilely
to occur under the instant statute for admission of tle evidence is entirely
discretionary with the appellate court. ilThrphy -e. Du!ffy, 46 R. I. 210, 124
Atl. 103 (1924) (court, confronted with this difficulty, ordered n~.w trial).
ARBITPATION AND AWARD--ARBITRATION AGRm,IENT NOT E.%O1-wo: ULL INi
FEDE iL CounRT.-The plaintiff, a resident of Pittsburg, entered into a
contract in New York with the defendant, a resident of Ncw Yori:. In 1921
an arbitration clause, enforceable under the New York Arbitration Law,
was incorporated into the contract. The plaintiff sued in the Rderal court
in violation of the arbitration clause. Held, that since the Arbitration Law
affected only the "remedy" as distinguished from the "right" of the partic2,
it could not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over actions brought
by non-residents. Lappe v. Wilco:', 14 Fed. (2d) 801 (N. D. N. Y. 192 ,).
Arbitration clauses from their inception have been uniformly di-favurcd
by the courts. Cohen, The Law of Coazercrial Arbitrution e7ad the N1WX
York Statute (1921) 31 YALE L.w JOURaNAL, 147, 152. Usage hao conti-
pellecl the courts to recognize such agreements. Finuca e Co. P. Board of
Education, 190 N. Y. 76, 83, 82 N. E. 737, 729 (1907) (damages allowed
for its breach). Nevertheless, the same court held that arbitration v:az
not a condition precedent to suit upon the contract. FincTnC Co. v. Board
of Education, svpra; cf. Mn ,son v. Straights of Dover S. S. Co., 102 Fed.
926 (C. C. A. 2d, 1900) (where fact that nominal damages might be allowed
for breach of agreement to arbitrate did not affect action on main con-
tract). The Arbitration Law of New York made the arbitration clauZe
irrevocable and specifically enforceable in New Yorh State courts. Matter
of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg I.zc., 230 N. Y. 201, 130 N. E. 283 (1921).
But where the main contract is sued upon in a federal court, as in the instant
case, the former difficulty is revived. Cf. Atlantfic Frzit Co. v. Red C7oss
Line, 276 Fed. 319 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). In the Matter of Petion of Red
Cross Line, 199 App. Div. 961, 191 N. Y. Supp. 949 (1st Dept. 1921) where
an arbitration agreement was contained in a maritime contract, this con-
struction gave rise to confusion. The United States Supreme Court re-
garded this as proper, although maritime contracts, as such, are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, since, inter alia, "the substantive
right created by an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration is recognized
as a perfect obligation2' Brandeis, J., in Red Cross Linze v. Atlantic Fruit
Co., 264 U. S. 109, 123, 44 Sup. Ct. 274, 277 (1924). But the Circuit Court
of Appeals subsequently decided that the plaintiff could recover on the
main contract by the appropriate remedies allowed him in the federal court.
Atlantic Fndt Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 Fed. (2d) 218 (C. C. A 2d, 1924).
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If the defendant were able to enforce his "substantive right" to arbitrate
in the state court so as to obtain an award before the plaintiff recovered
his judgment on the main contract in the federal court, the federal court
would have to give effect to the award. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic
Fruit Co., supra, at 121, 44 Sup. Ct. at 276. Since the enforcement of the
arbitration clause would result in an award which extinguishes the obli-
gations arising under the main contract, it would seem natural to consider
it as an integral part of the main contract. Whether the Supreme Court,
however, will reach that result by making the "substantive right" which
the defendant has in his remedy (arbitration clause) enforceable in the
federal court Is still an open question.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-PRIOR ASSENT OF MORTGAGEE IS NOT ACCEPTANC.-
Plaintiff was requested by A to become surety on his note. She agreed to
do so upon A's promise to give a chattel mortgage on his farming imple-
ments and stock. Thereafter, the mortgage was executed and delivered
to the recorder who complied with instructions to record and mail to the
plaintiff. Subsequently, but before the plaintiff learned of the execution
of the mortgage, the defendant sheriff attached the chattels covered by
the mortgage under an execution delivered to him by judgment creditors
of A. The plaintiff recovered judgment in an action of replevin and the
Appellate .Court affirmed the judgment. Held, on a writ of certiorari, that
the judgment be reversed, for the reason, inter alia, that an acceptance
will not be presumed in opposition to proof that the mortgagee had no
knowledge of the existence of the instrument. Talty v. Schoenhol,, 154
N. E. 139 (Ill. 1926).
It is commonly stated that delivery of a deed is not complete until
it is actually accepted by the grantee. 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915)
§ 501. Where, however, the grantor hands the instrument to a third
party for the use of the grantee, neither the grantor nor volunteers claiming
under him by virtue of descent or will can question the rights of the
grantee who had no knowledge of the deed until after such intervening
claims. Bradley v. Bradley, 185 Iowa, 1272, 171 N. W. 729 (1919); see
Rogers v. Head's Iron Foundry, 51 Neb. 39, 45, 70 N. W. 527, 529 (1897).
It is said that acceptance is presumed or that subsequent acceptance relates
back to the time of delivery. See Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Calif. 547, 561,
4 Pac. 473, 482 (1885). In fact, however, the requirement of acceptance
appears to be dispensed with for that purpose. But otherwise, where the
deed was executed to a donee and, before acceptance by him, the premises
were again conveyed by the grantor to a purchaser for value without
notice. Meade v. Robinson, 234 Mich. 322, 208 N. W. 41 (1926). Also
where the intervening right was that of a survivor of a joint tenancy.
Green v. Skinner, 185 Calif. 435, 197 Pac. 60 (1921). Likewise, where a
chattel mortgage was executed and delivered to a third party by a debtor
to secure his creditor without the latter's knowledge, and thereafter, but
before acceptance, judgment creditors of the debtor levied execution. Evans
v. Coleman, 101 Ga. 152, 28 S. E. 645 (1897); Kuh v. Garvin, 125 Mo.
547, 28 S. W. 847 (1894). The same result was reached where it was
a real property mortgage. Hemstreet v. Kutzner, 58 Ind. 319 (1877).
Contra: Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 256 (1847). And where it was a deed.
Hibberd v. Smith, supra. Contra: Nat'l Bank v. Bonnell, 46 App. Div. 302,
61 N. Y. Supp. 521 (2d Dept. 1899). The result of the instant case, on
its facts, is opposed to the current of decisions. McDonald Land Co. v.
Shapleigh Hardware Co., 163 Ark. 524, 260 S. W. 445 (1924); In To
Guyer, 69 Iowa, 585, 29 N. W. 826 (1886); Day v. Sines, 15 Wash. 525,
46 Pac. 1048 (1896). The court relied on Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 95 Il. 267 (1880). In that case, however, the grantee was a
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volunteer, and the conveyance was made to him to administer for the benefit
of the grantor's family, not for his own benefit. It would seem, therefore,
that since actual acceptance is for some purposes dispensed with, and since
no formality by way of acceptance is required, that a previous bargain
based on a valuable consideration could well be held to be a "presumed"
acceptance within the ritualistic requirements. Policy would seem to require
such a result.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE Pow -FL=..x=
TAnIF.r-The President, pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 941,
U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 5841-c, 19-24 (empowering him to change
tariff rates after due investigation) raised the tariff on barium dioxide 50
per cent. The plaintiff brought suit to recover the excess tariff on the
ground that the Act was a delegation of the legislative power in violation
of sections 1 and 8 of Article I of the Constitution. Held, (one judge
dissenting) that the relief be denied since the President carried out the
expressed will of Congress, and therefore there -was no usurpation of the
constitutional powers of that body. Hampton & Co. v. United State.-,
49 TnEAS. DEC. 595 (1926).
It is often said that legislative power can not be delegated. See 2
WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNsT rIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1910)
1317; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495 (1S92). The terms
"delegation" and "legislative powers" have become so confused, however,
that the maxim has become quite meaningless. (1924) 37 HYV. L. 1EV.
1118. Courts have quite uniformly sanctioned "delegation" to "non-legisla-
tive" bodies of powers termed "not in any real sense" legislative. Buttfield
v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1904) (Secretary of Treasury
given power to establish tea standards).. Thus an enormous amount of
power not "stricty" or "exclusively" or "essentially" legislative has been
delegated to administrative and executive bodies. Intc7-Mountaia Rate
Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986 (1914) (Interstate Commerce Com-
mission empowered to fix railroad rates) ; United States v. G;iaud, 220
U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480 (1911) (Secretary of Agriculture given power to
make rules and regulations for the protection of government forest re-
serve); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 3M4, 27 Sup. Ct.
367 (1907) (Secretary of War allowed to condemn bridges interfering
with navigation). Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283 (1924)
(Secretary of Labor empowered to deport aliens). In such cases the courts
say that "legislative powers" are not "delegated," but merely the finding
of a fact which is a "contingency" upon which the statute is to become
operative. State v. Hinkel, 131 Wis. 103, 111 N. W. 217 (1007) (act
enabling town electors to determine liquor license fee held constitutional) ;
State v. Zimnzernan, 197 N. W. 823 (Wis. 1925); (1923) 04 YLE LAW
JOURNAL, 325; (1925) 3 WIS. L. lREv. 124. The legislature's consideration
of more weighty problems might seriously be interfered with were it not
possible to delegate relatively unimportant matters of detail. On the other
hand, there is the danger of too great a concentration of power in one man
or small bureau. The instant decision represents a liberal attitude toward
the delegation of legislative powers, but as pointed out in the dissknting
opinion, it goes much further than previous cases.
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW-PARDONING POWER-SusProNDE Sm.'==Ec.-The
defendant was indicted under a non-support statute which provided for
fine or imprisonment or both, and empowered the court imposing the
sentence to suspend the same upon the giving of a bond by the defendant
conditioned on his supporting his wife. A demurrer was sustained to the
indictment. Held, on appeal, (three judges dissenting) that the judgment
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be affirmed on the ground that the suspension of the sentence was an in-
vasion of the pardoning power of the governor. State v. Jackson, 109
So. 724 (Miss. 1926).
Where a constitution confers upon the executive the power to grant par-
dons and reprieves, the legislature cannot exercise such power. United
States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (U. S. 1871); State v. Kirby, 96 Miss. 629,
51 So. 811 (1910). Most courts hold that a statute authorizing a court
to suspend the execution of sentence for an indefinite time, does not infringe
upon the pardoning power of the governor. State v. Starwich, 119 Wash.
561, 206 Pac. 29 (1922), (giving court general power in cases of first
offenders, except in certain cases) ; (1922) 26 A. L. R. 393, note. Contra:
State v. Anderson, 43 S. D. 630, 181 N. W. 839 (1921) (statute giving
court power in all criminal offenses). The legislature may impose any
reasonable penalty for certain acts. See Ware v. Sanders, 146 Iowa, 233,
246, 124 N. W. 1081, 1085 (1910). In the instant case the statute, in
effect, provides for alternative punishments: (1) fine or imprisonment or
both, or (2) bond conditioned on support of wife. Inasmuch as each al-
ternative may be regarded as a penalty, there remains an opportunity for
the executive to pardon or reprieve. See Ware v. Saunders, supra. The
main purpose of such a statute is to provide for the support of the wife.
See People v. Elbert, 287 Ill. 458, 462, 122 N. E. &16, 818 (1919). This
end is best attained by freedom of the husband, under pressure of the
bond and suspended sentence. Similar statutes are in force in nearly
every state. Their validity, on this ground, seems to have been questioned
in but one case, and there the statute was sustained. People v. Stickle, 156
Iich. 557, 121 N. W. 497 (1909).
CRIIiNAL LAW-1RIGHT" OF ACCUSED TO COUNSEL-REASONABLE TinlE TO
PREPARE DEFENSE.-The defendant was indicted for murder, and trial was
set for Tuesday, February 23. He employed no counsel, and on Friday,
four days before trial, one was assigned to him by the court. The de-
fendant not being acquainted with the counsel was suspicious and refused
to communicate with him, thinking he was a spy. At the trial counsel
moved for a continuance on the ground that he had not had time to pre-
pare his case in four days, two and one-half of which were holidays. The
motion was denied and the defendant convicted. Held, on appeal, (five
judges dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed since, inter alia, there
was no showing that more time was needed to procure witnesses, or that
counsel by additional time could have more "admirably" conducted the
defense. State v. Lynch, 134 Atl. 760 (N. J. 1926).
In criminal cases refusal to allow counsel a "reasonable time" under the
circumstances in which to prepare a defense is reversible error. Goben
v. State, 201 Pac. 812 (Okla. 1921); cf. Fuson v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky.
804, 251 S. W. 995 (1923). Courts, however, hold that the accused must
show that he suffered some disadvantage through lack of time, e. y., such
as impossibility of obtaining witnesses. James v. State, 27 Wyo. 378, 196
Pac. 1045 (1921). But other courts have recognized that the mere pres-
ence of witnesses is only a part of the preparation necessary to the con-
ducting of a defense. Allen v. Commonwealth, 168 Ky. 325, 182 S. W. 176
(1916); State v. Roberson, 157 La. 974, 103 So. 283 (1925). Skillful con-
duct of the defense is not conclusive that the counsel had a reasonable time
for preparation. Smith v. Commonwealth, 133 Ky. 532, 118 S. W. 368
(1909). The instant case, while purporting to recognize the "right" of
an accused to counsel, in effect reduces it to a mere formality in that it
denies an opportunity to make reasonable use of such counsel. The de-
cision seems particularly harsh because counsel was not only unable to
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share the confidence of the prisoner, but also hampered in obtaining in-
formation from outside sources due to the holidays.
CRIIIN.AL PROCEDURE-APE---SUFFICIENCY OF INDICTLENT.-A statute
provided that every male of the age of 17 years and upwards vho shall
have carnal knowledge of any female "not his wife" under the age of 16
shall be guilty of rape. The indictment charged that Fathers, who as
over 17 "unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously" made an assault upon Ella
Slade who was under 16 "with the intent to ravish and carnally kmow her."
The defendant was convicted. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be re-
versed on the ground that the indictment did not allege that the proseau-
trix was not the wife of the defendant. People v. Fathcre, 153 N. E. 701
(Ill. 1926).
Generally, an indictment or information for rape, or assault with intent
to commit rape, need not allege that the prosecutrix was not the wife of
the accused. Curtis v. State, 89 Ark. 394, 117 S. W. 521 (1909); State v.
Edy, 24-4 Pac. 538 (Or. 1926). See 3 BisuoP, NEW CraratmL PnocguurE
(2d ed. 1913) § 956. That the prosecutrix is his wife is usually regarded
as a matter of defense. State v. Williamson, 22 Utah, 248, 62 Pac. 1022
(1900); Comwonwealth v,. Landis, 129 Ky. .145, 112 S. W. 5M1 (1903);
(1910) 16 ANN. CAs. 901, note. But where the statute specifies an a!zault
on one "not the wife" of the defendant, some courts hold that a failure to
negative the marital relation renders the indictment insufficient. Yovng r.
Territory, 8 Okla. 525, 53 Pac. 724 (1899); Dzdlcy v. State,
37 Tex. Cr. App. 543, 40 S. W. 269 (1897); People v,. Mike, 9 Calif. App.
312, 101 Pac. 525 (1908). Contra: State v. Morrison, 4G .1ont. 81, 125
Pac. 649 (1912). Cf. Rex v. Wright, 39 Nova Scotia, 103 (190G) (waived
by failure to object before pleading to indictment). If the language of
the indictment clearly negatives the idea of marriage it should be sufficient.
See Curtis v. State, supra at 400, 117 S. W. at 524; State v. Haynce, 242
Pac. 603, 604 (Or. 1926). See contra: People v. Miles, eupra, at :314, 101
Pac. at 526. The difference between the surnames of the prosecutrLx and the
defendant in the instant ease should suffice. Even in Illinois it has been
held that an indictment charging a forcible assault need not allege that
the prosecutri% was not the wife of the accused. People v. Dravilic, 321
Ill. 390, 152 N. E. 212 (1926). The instant holding seems too techlnical.
Cf. (1926) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 275.
EVIDENCE-SILENCE AFE AN ACCUSATION-EFFECT OF SUncqrrQENT
DENIAL.-While under arrest the defendants were accused of murder
by one F. Both defendants remained silent for several minutes and then
one made a denial and the other stated he would tell his tale in court.
Evidence of these statements and the defendants' conduct was admitted
in a trial for murder, and the defendants were convicted. Held, on appeal,
(one judge dissenting) that the admission of the evidence was reversible
error. State v. Hester, 134 S. E. 885 (S. C. 1920).
A defendant's silence after an accusation of crime, under circumstances
calling for a denial, renders evidence of the accusation and the defendant's
conduct admissible as showing an assent to the truth of such accusation.
State v. Won, 248 Pac. 201 (Iont. 1926); People v. O'Donnell, 315 Ill.
568, 146 N. E. 490 (1925); People v. Taylor, 70 Calif. App. 239, 232 Pac.
998 (1924). Some courts regard the mere fact of arrest of itself as a suf-
ficient excuse for silence, and hence exclude such evidence. Saundcrs v.
Stqte, 244 Pac. 55 (Okla. 1926). But the more practical view is that
-est is merely one of the circumstances to be considered in determining
ther or not a denial should have been made. Quinn v. State, 109 So.
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368 (Ala. 1926); (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 300. A spontaneous denial
renders an inference of assent unreasonable, and therefore the accusation
and denial are excluded. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 607, 63 Atl.
134 (1906). Likewise where the defendant replies that his counsel has
advised him to keep silent. People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, 104 N. E.
804 (1914). Contra: People v. Graney, 48 Calif. App. 773, 192 Pac. 460
(1920). Where, however, the denial or reply follows a period of silence,
as in the instant case, it would not seem unreasonable for the jury to
draw an inference of assent, and hence the evidence might well have been
held admissible. Cf. Price v. United States, 5 Fed. (2d). 650 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925). Since the fact of such a reply alone is equivocal, it would seem
that the ruling made by the trial court, which had an opportunity to ob-
serve evidence of all the circumstances, should be conclusive.
EVIDENCE-WAIVER OF INCOMPETENCY UNDER "DEAD MAN" STATUTE.-Tho
plaintiff sued an executor for services rendered to the deceased. On cross-
examination she was asked why she had increased the amount of the claim
stated in her complaint before trial. She replied by relating the services ren-
dered to the deceased. From a judgment for the plaintiff in the lower court,
the defendant appealed on the ground that the reply was improperly ad-
mitted under a statute rendering incompetent the testimony of one party
to a transaction with a party now deceased. Held, that the judgment be
reversed, because the question referred only to the plaintiff's conduct after
the institution of the suit and not to any transaction with the deceased.
Pulliam v. Hege, 135 S. E. 288 (N. C. 1926).
Most states have "dead man" statutes rendering interested parties in-
competent to testify as to past transactions with a person since deceased.
5 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 2222; 1 WIaMOm,
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 578. The protection of such statutes, however, is
held to be waived where the representative of the deceased calls the survivor
to testify as to the transaction. Payne v. Payne, 11 Fed. (2d) 464 (C. C. A.
D. C. 1926); Waldauer v. Parks, 106 So. 881 (Miss. 1926). Or introduces
a deposition or former testimony of the deceased. Wooton v. Jones, 286
S. W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). Or cross examines the survivor as to
the transaction. Grissom v. Sternberger, 10 Fed. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th,
1926); Kings County Trust Co. v. Hyams, 242 N. Y. 405, 152 N. E. 129
(1926). But there is no waiver if the cross-examination is limited to matters
admitted over objection. Bowlen v. Baker, 147 Tenn. 36, 245 S. W. 416
(1922); In 'e Goehring's Estate, 263 Pa. 47, 106 Atl. 60 (1919). Or if
the purpose of the cross-examination is merely to disclose the witness's
interest. Cordingley v. Kennedy, 239 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917) ; Good-
let v. Kelley, 74 Ala. 213 (1883). Hence it seems that most courts re-
quire that the cross-examination must actually "open the door" to the tran-
sactions in question to constitute a waiver. Grissom v. Sternberger, supra;
5 JONES, op. cit. supra, § 2279. Some courts, however, are more liberal in
admitting such evidence. Thus it has been held that an interested person
may testify regarding a fact existing after the death of the deceased al-
though such testimony might inferentially tend to disclose a transaction
with the deceased. Keating v. Nolan, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 320 (1912); Krepps
v. Carlisle, 157 Pa. 358, 27 Atl. 741 (1893). And where the decedent's repre-
sentative questioned the survivor concerning an incident occurring during the
decedent's life, a relevant answer was held admissible although it went into
the transactions with the deceased. Messinger v. Patterson Savings Inst.,
91 N. J. L. 654, 103 Atl. 178 (1918). Since, in the instant case, the question
was propounded by the defendant and the answer was relevant, the court
might well have held that the defendant had "opened the door" to the
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transaction. Such testimony may be properly evaluated by the judge or
jury, or exposed by cross-examination. While the purpose of the statutes
is said to be to protect estates from fraudulent claims, a strict application
may often endanger the estates of the living by preventing proof of honest
claims. Cf. 1 WiGMoas, op. cit. supra, § 578.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-MARRIAGE OF INSANE PERSONS SUBJECT To A'rAcx
BY THIRD PRTms.-The insured's father was made the original beneficiary
of his war risk insurance. Subsequently, the insured married and named
his wife as beneficiary. The insured and his father died, and the plaintiffs,
heirs of the father, sued on the policy, and the insured's wife intervened.
The wife demurred to the plaintiff's allegation that the marriage ceremony
was performed when the insured was insane. Held, that the demurrer be
overruled on the ground that any contract made by an insane party is
"void" and may be attacked in any proceeding where its existence is in
issue. Sothern v. United States, 12 Fed. (2d) 936 (E. D. Ark. 1920).
A contract entered into with an insane person by a party who has no
knowledge of the insanity is binding on the insane person after it has been
executed. In r'e Pfei's Estate, 134 AtI. 385 (Pa. 1926) ; Molton v. Camroux,
2 Exch. 487 (1848), aff'd 4 Exch. 17 (1849); but see 1 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS (1920) § 257 (all contracts by one under guardianship said to be
"void"). Contra: Jordan v. Kirkpatrick, 251 Ill. 116, 95 IT. E. 1079 (1911).
Where the other party had knowledge of the insanity, however, it is
"voidable" by the insane person. De Vries v. Crofoot, 148 Mich. 183, 111
N. W. 775 (1907) (recovery by insane person of value of land sold by him);
ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1919) § 166, n. But not by a third
party. McClure Realty & Investinent Co. v. Eubanks, 151 Ga. 163, 103
S. E. 204 (1921) ; cf. Porter v. Broolzs, 159 S. W. 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
It has been held, however, that a marriage entered into by an insane person
can be collaterally attacked. Jenkins v. Jelins, 32 Ky. 102 (1834) (wife
not entitled to dower) ; cf. Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 IlL 14, 49 N. E. 197
(1898); see 2 SCHOULER, MIArAGE, Di vOcE, SE ArATION AND Do='.-inc
RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) § 1107. Otherwise, where the insane party has
ratified such a marriage in a lucid interval. Sabolot v. Popzdas, 31 La.
Ann. 854 (1879) (ratification by cohabitation); cf. Ca.tor ',. Darf3, 120
Ind. 231, 22 N. E. 110 (1889) (court "presumed" insanity did not last a
lifetime in order to protect wife's interest in the estate) ; Cole v,. Cole, 37
Tenn. 57 (1857); but see TnAxY, DoS isc REWATIONS (3d ed. 1921) 20.
But -where collateral attack has been allowed, the facts have usually dis-
closed that the other party induced the insane person to marry in order
to get his property. Cf. Orchardson v'. Cofield, supra. Marriages by insane
persons are now generally controlled by statutes. Some declare the mar-
riages invalid from the date of a judicial annulment decree Arn. Dig.
(Crawford, 1921) § 7041; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) C. 1.4, § 7.
Others prohibit certain marriages, including marriages by insane pca-ple.
Under such a statute it has been held that a prohibited marriage cannot
be attacked after the death of one of the parties. Lan. v. Lau, 122 Ati.
345 (N. H. 1923) (widow's rights recognized); cf. Bims -e. Cope, 182
Ind. 289, 105 N. E. 471 (1914) (same result where such marriages were
declared "void" by the statute). Thus it appears that there is a tendency
to shield such marriages from collateral attack. The instant decision eem s
undesirable for it would appear that the widow should be protected in the
absence of proof that any undue advantage was taken of the insane perzon.
INSURAN cE-TRUsTEE op BANxRUPT BNEFICLnY COnroMIAoTION ENTITWD
To CASH VALuE-The defendant issued insurance policics on the life of A,
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the chief stockholder and vice-president of the beneficiary corporation. The
premiums were paid by the corporation. The insured listed the cash value
of the policies as assets on the corporation's books. The corporation be-
came bankrupt, and the insured, under a reserved power in the policies,
named a new beneficiary. The trustee in bankruptcy sued for the cash
value of the policies. Held, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Mac-
Laren v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 14 Fed. (2d) 308 (D. lMinn. 1926).
The fact that the value of the policy is listed by the insured as an asset
of the beneficiary does not destroy the reserved power of the insured to
change the beneficiary. Brown v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 Fed. (2d) 661 (D.
Okla. 1925). Nor does the possession of the policy by the beneficiary. Jory
v. Supreme Council of A. L. of H., 105 Calif. 20, 38 Pac. 524 (1894). Other-
wise, where a gift of the policy has been made to the beneficiary. MoEwon
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 Calif. App. 133, 183 Pac. 373 (1919). Or
where a party is made beneficiary to secure a loan. MeGrew v. MeGrew,
190 Ill. 604, 60 N. E. 861 (1901). Nor does the mere voluntary payment
of premiums prevent a change of beneficiary. Wentworth v. Equitable Life
Assur. Sec., 65 Utah, 581, 238 Pac. 648 (1925); of. COOLEY, BRIEFS ON TlE
LAW OF INSURANCE (1905) 3765. Otherwise, where such payment is made
in consideration of a promise by the insured not to change the beneficiary.
Jacobson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 199 Iowa, 770, 202 N. W. 578 (1925).
Where the beneficiary is a business concern, and pays the premiums, it
has been held that while the insured may change the beneficiary, the con-
cern may recover such payments from the subsequent beneficiary upon the
death of the insured. Brown v. Home Life Ins. Co., supra. The instant
case appears to be the first raising the question of the beneficiary's right
that the insurance company pay the cash surrender value of the policy
before the death of the insured.
MONOPOLIES--RESTRAINT OF TRADE-COMBINATION TO CONTROL SUPPLY OF
LABOR.-The defendant association controlled substantially all of the Ameri-
can merchant marine on the Pacific coast and conducted a central employ-
ment bureau, which assigned jobs to seamen in the order of application
without reference to the type of work, vessel, or voyage which the men pre-
ferred. The plaintiff, a member of the Seamen's Union, sued under the
Sherman Act to enjoin the defendant from requiring a certificate from its
employment bureau as a condition to employment of any person by any of
its members, as an unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce. The lower
court dismissed the suit. Held, on appeal, that the order be reversed. An-
derson v. Shipowner's Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. T. 1926,
No. 306.
Employers' associations which are formed to secure control of the labor
market have been held not within the Sherman Act even though their activity
"incidentally" interfered with interstate commerce. Tilbury v. Orcgon
Stevedoring Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; Industrial Ass'n of San
Francisco v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 45 Sup. Ct. 403 (1925) (agreement
of employers in the building trade to refuse permits for purchase of certain
building materials to employers who did not adopt "American Plan"). It
has also been held that "incidental" interference with interstate commerce
resulting from regulation of business in which a group of entrepreneurs
is engaged does not bring the combination within the Sherman Act. Ander-
son v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 19 Sup. Ct. 50 (1898). In none of these
cases was the end ultimately desired the termination of interstate ship-
ments of commodities, i. e., the restraining of interstate commerce. In the
first two the end was rather to strengthen the position of the members of
the combination in the bargaining competition with their workers, and in
the latter to reasonably regulate business. Striking employees on interstate
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carriers have been privileged to strike under the Clayton Act even when
the substantial interference with interstate commerce would seem to have
been neither "incidental" nor "indirect." Michaclon v. UnZited States, 266
U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18 (1924). But the court in the instant case refused to
allow an entrepreneur association to control any "instrumentality of com-
merce," whether material equipment or labor supply, to the detriment of
interstate trade or commerce. It is significant that the court scemed to
abandon the argument used in the Ind tstrial Ass'n case, mpra, that it would
be inconsistent to hold unlawful an employer's combination to fruatrate
activity of employees, since an agreement by employees to strike with the
object of closing a mine, but which indirectly interfered in like degree with
interstate commerce, had not been held unlawful under the Sherman Act.
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570
(1922). The purpose of the Shipowners' Association in the instant case
was not different from that of the defendants in either the Tilbury case,
supra, or the Indzistrial Association case, s2.pra. Qucry: Is a different con-
clusion reached (1) because the court did not like the specific practices of
the defendant, (2) because the restraint was more extensive as a matter of
fact than in the previous cases, or (3) because the court recognized that a
different treatment of combinations to control the supply of labor, organized
on the one hand by employers' associations, and on the other by labor
unions, may be justified on economic and social grounds, as well as under
the Clayton Act, although in both cases interstate commerce is affected.
PROCEDUR,-INSURANCE--PROOF OF WAvIsn OF CONDITIO: UNDER A, ALLE, -
GATION OF PERFoR~uNCE.In an action on a fire insurance policy the plain-
tiff alleged that he had complied with all the conditions. At the trial the
plaintiff's evidence was admitted to show a waiver of the non-fulfillment of
the condition that the assured furnish proofs of loss. Judgment was given
for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed on the
ground that the evidence admitted was inconsistent with the allegations of
the complaint. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hvghes, 249 Pae. 908 (Okla. 1926).
In ordinary breach of contract actions, most courts require waiver of
non-fulfillment of condition to be specifically alleged in order that proof
of it may be admitted at the trial. Flickingcr v. Wrcun Ins. Co., 172 Calif.
132, 155 Pac. 627 (1916); (1925) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 394. But in insurance
cases, where the defendant's general denial or demurrer is the last plea
of record, as in the instant case, some courts hold such allegation un-
necessary. Fraternal League v. Swezey, 134 Ind. 378,111 N. E. 205 (1916) ;
Makos v. Banker's Accident Ins. Co., 234 S. W. 369 (MAIo. 1921). Contra:
Kahler v. Iowa, Ins. Co., 106 Iowa, 380, 76 N. W1'. 734 (1893) ; United BCevo-
lent Soc. v. Shepherd, 66 S. W. 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) ; (1926) 20 I. L.
Rnv. 499. But if the plaintiff specifically denies the defendant's plea of non-
fulfillment of condition, failure to allege a waiver in the complaint or reply
bars proof of it at trial. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 47 Kan. 1,
27 Pac. 100 (1891). Contra: Pace v. Aierican Cent. Ins. Go., 173 Mo. App.
485, 158 S. W. 892 (1913). Where by statute it is unnecessary that the
plaintiff reply to the defendant's plea, most courts do not require a special
allegation in the complaint. Norris v. Hartford Ins. Co., 57 S. C. 03S, 25
S. E. 572 (1900); Mabee v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 Idaho, 667, 219
Pac. 598 (1923). Contra: Insurance Co. v'. Gore, 284 S. W. 1107 (Ky. 1926) ;
cf. Volunteer Life Ins. Go. v. McGinnis, 25 Ga. App. 503, 103 S. E. 824
(1920). At least two jurisdictions with such statutes have required a
special allegation where the waiver is of what is termed a "promissory war-
ranty." Anderson v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 116 Misc. 679, 190 N. Y. Supp. 548
(Sup. Ct. 1921) (agreement to furnish statement as to origin of fire);
Aronson v. Frankfurt Ins. Co., 9 Calif. App. 473, 99 Pac. 537 (1909) (notice
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of loss); but cf. Miller v. Union Indemnity Co., 209 App. Div. 455, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 730 (4th Dept. 1924). But not where the waiver is of a "warranty."
Black Co. v. London Pay. Co., 190 App. Div. 218, 180 N. Y. Supp. 74 (4th
Dept. 1919) (statement as to amount of losses suffered by insured for period
before application); Raulet v. N. W. Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Calif. 213, 107 Pac.
292 (1910). (incumbrance on property at time of application); (1919) 5
CORN. L. Q. 351. Even those courts which require a special allegation of
waiver are liberal in construing the pleadings as being sufficient to allow
proofs of the waiver. Sun Fire Office v. Fraser, 5 Kan. App. 63, 47 Pac.
327 (1896); Miglier v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 102 Misc. 461, 169 N. Y. Supp.
45 (Sup. Ct. 1918); cf. Continental Ins. Co. v. Chance, 48 Okla. 324, 150
Pac. 114 (1915). Although more cases are probably in accord with the
instant case, yet it seems out of line with the modern pleading tendency
toward simplified procedure.
QUASI-CONTRACTS--RECOVERY OF PURCHASE MONEY PAID UNDER A CON-
TRACT FOR THE SALE OF LAND AFTER BREACH BY THEVENDEE.-The plain-
tiff, after giving $500 in part payment under a contract to purchase land,
refused to perform further. Nearly a year later, the plaintiff notified the
defendants of his readiness to complete the purchase, but the defendants
nevertheless sold the land to other persons. Time was not made of the
essence by the contract, nor was there any provision for forfeiture. The
plaintiff sued on the common counts for money had and received to recover
the purchase money paid. The lower court gave judgment for the de-
fendants. Held, that the judgment be reversed. Chandler v. Wilder, 110
So. 306 (Ala. 1926).
Where both parties are in default at the time stipulated for performance,
it would seem that recovery of the purchase money paid should be allowed.
KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893) 229; of. Dent v. Johnson, 111 Neb. 162,
195 N. W. 938 (1923); Liebling v. Renfer, 211 Ill. App. 370 (1918). Where
the vendee is materially in default, but the vendor is ready and willing
to perform, the majority of the cases deny recovery to the defaulting
vendee. Jensen v. Coming Farm Co., 49 Calif. App. 681, 194 Pac. 83
(1920); Gibson v. Brannum, 107 Okla. 130, 230 Pac. 861 (1924); WOOD-
WARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913) § 177. Contra: Dooley v. Stillon, 46
R. I. 332, 128 Atl. 217 (1925) ; See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1476.
This result, apparently, is reached whether or not there is a forfeiture pro-
vision in the contract. Friedland v. Argentor Holding Corp., 214 App. Div.
242, 211 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1st Dept. 1925) (forfeiture provision); Moss
v. Rubenstein, 117 Misc. 385, 191 N. Y. Supp. 496 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (no for-
feiture provision). And, generally, without considering whether the breach
is wilful, or unintentional or unavoidable. WOODWARD, loc. cit. supra; 3
WILLISTON, loc. cit. supra. The rule obtains though the vendor re-sells
the land after the vendee's" default. King v. Milliken, 248 Mass. 460, 143
N. E. 511 (1924); Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609, 79 Atl. 772 (1911); of.
Harrington v. Eggen, 51 N. D. 87, 199 N. W. 447 (1924). It has, however,
been intimated that if the purchaser subsequently reconsiders his refusal
and tenders payment to the vendor before the resale, the vendor might be
put to an election to perform the contract or to return the payments re-
ceived. Sanders v. Brock, supra. See Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach
of Contract (1921). 5 MINN. L. REv. 329, 336. Although the instant case
presents such a situation, it was not decided on that ground. It would
seem that a subsequent change of mind should not alter the legal relations
arising from the repudiation. The court in the instant case seems to
have treated the subsequent resale as a "rescission" of the contract, entitling
the vendee to a refund of the money paid. Cf. Pierce v. Staub, 78 Conn,
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459, 62 Atl. 760 (1906). Although the formalistic approach of the court
to the problem through the unanalyzed concept of "rescission" is to ba
regretted, the actual result would appear to be sound. It has bean argued
that to permit a wilful contract breaker to recover payments made would
be to encourage breach of contract. WOODWAM, Op. cit. 52UpMa, §§ 167-172.
But a denial of recovery imposes a forfeiture correspondingly harzher
as the degree of partial performance is greater, and may rcsult in giving
to the defendant more than a fair compensation for the non-completion
of the contract. Britton v. Tunizer, 6 N. H. 431 (1834) (contract of ser-
vice) ; Ballantine, loc. cit. supra. "The duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not hcp it-
and nothing else." HOLmEs, COLLECTED LrG.L PAPErS (1921) 1G7, 175.
In other situations a defendant's dereliction is measured by the plaintiff's
harm, and it is believed that here also a more desirable result will be
reached by permitting recovery for benefits conferred by part performance,
but holding the vendee to strict accountability for any damage caused by
his default. For the attitude of the courts to the same problem in cases
of contracts for the sale of goods, building contracts, and contracts of
service, see WOODWA ., op. cit. supra, §§ 174-176; Ballantine, loc. cit. Iupra.;
(1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 101; (1923) 2 Wis. L. REV. 313; (1921)
69 U. P. L. REv. 1S7.
T.4xATION\-INCOME TAx-PARTNESHIP Pnonrs AsSIGmD To Wi-
TAXABLE To HUSBALND-By federal statute [40 Stat. 1070, (1919) U. S.
Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 6336 i, i] members of partnerships are liable
for income tax on their distributive share of the net profits, but only in
their individual capacity. By an agreement, terminable by either party
at any time, the plaintiff assigned to his wife one-half of his share in the
future profits of a partnership, and she became responsible for one-half of
any losses that he might sustain as a partner. The plaintiff paid, under
protest, an income tax assessed upon his entire share. In a suit to re-
cover part of the tax, the lower court found for the Collector. Held, on
appeal, (one judge dissenting) that the tax was proper and would ba
even though the assignment were absolute. Mitchel v. Bou,crs, 15 Fed. (2d)
287 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
It has recently been held that since income from community property
is at the disposition of the husband, it is taxable wholly to him. United
States v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315, 46 Sup. Ct. 143 (1926). But cf. Uaggo,
Coimmunity Property and the Federal Income Tax (1920) 14 C, r. L. Rnv.
351, 356. By this criterion, the tax in the instant case seems proper, since
the power to terminate the assignment at any time gives the assignor the
option of resuming his right to the profits or of allowing them to pass
to his wife. But the same result seems desirable, even though the as-
signment were absolute, where there is an attempt to evade the surtax.
Thus the Treasury has consistently ruled that assignment of future profits,
with or without consideration, does not exempt them from taxation as
income of the assignor. (1923) A. R. R. 2245, I-1 Cure. Bull. 61; (1924)
S. M. 2763, 111-2 Cum. Bull. 53; (1926) S. 1. 43S92, V-7 Weeldy Bull. 10.
These rulings cite as analogies, holdings that payments by a lessee directly
to the stockholders of a lessor company constitute taxable income to the
lessor company. Blaloc v. Georgia Ry. & Electric Co., 246 Fed. 3S7 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1917); Rensselaer & Saratoga R. R. v. Irvin, 249 Fed. 720 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1918). The reason given for such holding is that except for this
arrangement, the payments would be made to the lessor company, and hence
would be taxable to it. See West End St. Ry. v,. Malley, 246 Fed. 625, 627
(C. C. A. 1st, 1917); Houston Terminal Co. v. United States, 250 Fed. 1,
5 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918) ; cf. (1922) BIim. 3040, 1I-1 Cum. Bull. 48.
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TRUSTS-CHARITABLE TRUSTS-POWER OF EQUITY TO PERMIT MORTGAGINa
OF TRUST PROPERTY.-Land and buildings were deeded in trust to be used
as an educational institution, the deed containing a provision against alien-
ation or encumbrance. The buildings fell into such decay that it became
necessary to mortgage the trust property to preserve it. The heirs of the
donor sued to enjoin execution of the mortgage. The lower court gave
judgment for the defendants. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be re-
versed on the ground that the court could not authorize the mortgage, be-
cause it would violate the intent of the donor. Lovelace v. Marion Institute,
110 So. 381 (Ala. 1926).
Equity courts, under the "judicial cy pres" doctrine, are said to have
power to carry out the purpose of the settlor as nearly as possible where it
is impracticable to follow the exact terms of the trust. BOGERT, TRUSTS
(1921) 225. But the "prerogative cy pres" power, applied in England
whenever the purpose of the charity is illegal, or where the property is left to
charity generally, is said, in America, to be vested in the various legisla-
tures. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 792
(1889) ; 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES (13th ed. 1884) 581, n. (b). Most Ameri-
can courts profess to administer charitable trusts under the guise of judicial
cy pres; but many of the actual holdings are as liberal as could be expected
under the "prerogative power." Adams v. Page, 76 N. H. 96, 81 Atl. 1074
(1911) (property left to found a hospital; court applied it to one already in
existence); In re Y. W. C. A., 96 N. J. Eq. 568, 126 Atl. 610 (1924) (land
devised for permanently maintaining home for working girls sold, and
proceeds administered for their benefit); Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348,
17 N. E. 839 (1888) (trustee who was designated to select charitable benefi-
ciaries died; court applied fund according to its own plan). Thus in a
number of cases there seems to be little factual distinction between the "judi-
cial" and "prerogative" cy pres doctrines. It has been stated that American
courts apply both. 2 REDFIELD, WILLS (3d ed. 1876) 544; criticized by PERRY,
TRUSTS (6th ed. 1911) 1182, n. 1. The court in the instant case concedes
that it has equitable jurisdiction to "uphold . . . enforce and prevent
the abuse" of charitable trusts. Such has been the holding of the Alabama
courts. Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299 (1862) (devise to township for
benefit of pauper children upheld) ; Johns v. Birmingham Trust Co., 205 Ala.
535, 88 So. 835 (1921) (devise to defendant to select as beneficiary an as-
sociation which cared for orphan children) ; of. Universalist Convention of
Alabama v. May, 147 Ala. 455, 41 So. 515 (1906) (cy pres doctrine re-
pudiated because based upon prerogative of crown). Other courts, under
their "general equitable jurisdiction" have apparently sanctioned a sale
of the trust res where its retention as such was no longer practicable.
Town of South Kingstown v. Wakefield Trust Co., 134 Atl. 815 (R. I. 1926) ;
Patton v. First Presbyterian Church of Greenville, 129 S. C. 15, 123 S. E. 493
(1924). Thus it appears that there is no inherent disability in equity juris-
prudence to prevent a court from authorizing a mortgage in a case such as
the instant one. Whether or not such power should be exercised ought to
be controlled by the needs of the beneficiary and not by a self-imposed limit-
ation deduced from the technical lack of authorization by the settler, or his
supposed intent.
